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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
Such an interlocal controversy was before the Court in the
case of Toum of Pelham v. City of Mount Vernon.8 The munici-
palities had for many years shared equally the cost of mainte-
nance and repair of an inter-municipal bridge. When major re-
pairs became necessary a dispute arose as to which of two statutes
was applicable. The bourt held (4-3) for the defendant city, ac-
cepting its contention that the situation was governed by High-
way Law §250, 9 which provides that each municipality shall pay
"its just and equitable share". The dissenters, attacking flaws
in the reasoning of the majority, urged that the applicable statute,
as contended by plaintiff town, was County Law §61,10 which pro-
vides f6r payment "in proportion to the assessed valuation of
[the] city and town." This case is not of major legal significance,
but it is illustrative of the type of controversy which follows from
the creation of local units with broad and pervasive powers. A
municipality exercising the powers granted to it almost inevitably
comes into conflict with the rights and powers of others.
Community Planning
Among the powers given to municipalities are those which
contemplate community planning, the most obvious of which is
the zoning power.1  The Court of Appeals during the last term
had two occasions to discuss this power.
It is the law of New York that uses which do not conform to
a zoning ordinance but which existed before its enactment, will,
as a general rule, be permitted to continue.' It is frequently ex-
plained that the owner has secured a "vested" right in the par-
ticular use.13 The rationale seems to be that the destruction of
substantial structures or businesses developed prior to the ordi-
nance is not balanced by the advantage to the public of effective
zoning. 4 In People v. Miller'5 defendant was convicted of vio-
8. 304 N. Y. 15, 105 N. E. 2d 604 (1952), motion for reargument denied, 304
N. Y. 594, 105 N. E. 2d 604 (1952).
9. Now HIGHWAY LAw §232.
10. Now HIGHWAY LAw § 131-b.
11. See McQmun=, op. cit., §§ 25.01 et seq.
12. For a general discussion of what constitutes a nonconforming use, see McQum-
LmN, op. cit.. §§ 25.185-25.188.
13. People ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 App. Div. 87, 229 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1st
Dep't 1928), aff'd without opinion, 250 N. Y. 598, 166 N. E. 339 (1929).
14. For a discussion of a recent development in the area see 1 BF.o. L. REV. 286
(1952).
15. 304 N. Y. 105, 106 N. B. 2d 34 (1952).
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lating a zoning ordinance which prohibited the maintenance of
any premises or structure for the harboring of pigeons. Defend-
ant contended on appeal that the pre-existing use of his premises
for harboring pigeons rendered the ordinance unenforceable as
against him. The Court of Appeals in unanimously sustaining the
conviction held that the nonconforming use was not such as will be
protected, in that only a relatively slight and insubstantial prop-
erty right was affected. Judge Fuld set out the rule which the
Court will apply:
In this state . . . existing nonconforming uses will be per-
mitted to continue despite the enactment of a prohibitory
zoning ordinance, if, and only if, enforcement of the ordinance
would, by rendering valueless substantial improvements or
business built up over the years, cause serious financial harm
to the property owner.
This. it would appear, presents the formula to be applied to future
fact situations.
The Court had an opportunity to examine another aspect of
the problem of nonconforming uses in City of Buffalo v. Roadway
Trans-it Co."s The drafters of zoning ordinances, recognizing
the protection afforded pre-existing nonconforming uses, frequent-
ly impose limitations upon changes in such uses.17 A Buffalo
ordinance' s thus provided: "A nonconforming use shall not be
changed except to a more restrictive use." An amendment to
this ordinance in 1930 substituted other language: "(A) noncon-
forming use may be changed, when changed to a more restricted
use." The property involved in the instant case was located in a
residential section. Prior to the passage of the zoning ordinance,
the premises were used as a public garage. This use was con-
tinued as a matter of right until 1946. Defendant at that time
leased the premises and converted the same into a freight ter-
minal, a use of the same grade under the zoning ordinance as a
public garage. The Court of Appeals in holding that this con-
version was not authorized, refused to accept defendant's con-
tention that the 1930 amendment should be interpreted to author-
ize a change to a use of equal grade since it did not expressly pro-
hibit any change. The Court pointed out that such a strained inter-
pretation would not be in harmony with the basic purpose of zon-
16. 303 N. Y. 453, 104 N. E. 2d 96 (1952).
17. McQuILLI., op. cit., § 25.181 at 364.
18. § 23 of Chap. LXX (1926).
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ing laws, "to bring about ultimate conformity in the use dis-
triets.)',z
A power kindred to that of prescribing the uses to which land
may be put is that of taking land for public use by condemnation.
This power of eminent domain, which is inherent in the sovereign,
has been granted to municipalities by the New York State Legis-
lature.20  There is no dispute that the holder of a fee is entitled
to an award upon condemnation. Difficulties sometimes arise,
however, when the condemnation affects incorporeal heredita-
ments. Such a case was considered by the Court of Appeals in
the 1951-52 term.21  A street closing condemnation proceeding
was instituted in order to consolidate city owned abutting proper-
ties for the purpose of constructing a bus garage and shop. Claims
were filed by the electric and gas companies for alleged damages
to their franchises, mains and services. The damages awarded
the utilities were measured solely by the stipulated cost of re-
locating their facilities.2 A claim of the gas company for an anti-
quated main which had been abandoned was disallowed. The
Appellate Division. unanimously affirmed the lower court.2 3 Both
the gas company and the city appealed by permission. The Court
of Appeals, in affirming (5-2), pointed out that the municipal
function here involved was "proprietary" and not "govern-
mental" and that, therefore, even under the common law rule
the utilities would be entitled to more than the right to remove
their installations; but held that the common law rule has been
abrogated in New York City by statute.24  The dissenters, in an
opinion by Fuld, J., approached the problem from a different view-
point. The city had only an easement to maintain the street, they
pointed out; had it given up that easement instead of acquiring the
fee, the sole right of the claimants would have been to remove
19. For a discussion of another aspect of community planning see Brous v. Smith,
304 N. Y. 164, 106 N: E. 2d 503 (1952), holding constitutional Tow- LAW §280a,
which requires that. a suitably improved road give access to a subdivision before
building permits be issued, over a developer's contention that it was violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive and ca-
pricious.
20. See, e.g., Couy LAW §215; BUFFALO Crry CHA~Rm § 10 (3).
21. In re Gillen Place, Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York, 304 N. Y. 215,
106 N. E. 2d 897 (1952).
22. 195 Misc. 685, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
23. 278 App. Div. 779, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (2d Dep't 1951).
24. Street dosing condemnation proceedings are authorized by N-w YoRK Crrv
ADMIrzsTRAT n CODE § E 15-3, 0 (b), which provides that compensation is to be paid
to owners of real property affected or damaged; § 15-1.0 (5) defines real property to
include all surface and subsurface structures, all easements and hereditaments, cor-
poreal and incorporeal.
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their chattels. The situation here, they urged, is analogous; the
closing of the street terminated the franchise and the utilities' sole
right should be to remove their property.2 5
Municipal Borrowing
Like the other incidents of local government, the power to
borrow money and contract indebtedness is not inherent, nor can
it be exercised unless it is conferred either expressly or by neces-
sary implication.28 In New York State the power is expressly
granted to municipalities by the State Constitution.2 T Although
there is some trend toward pay-as-you-go financing by local units,
millions of dollars of capital improvements are financed by bond
issues. At the present time, because of the tax-free nature of
income from municipal bonds,2" this borrowing is accomplished at
very favorable interest rates.2 9 Such was not always the case,
however, and there are still municipal bonds in the hands of in-
vestors at interest rates of four to six percent and higher. Obvi-
ously, it is to a municipality's advantage to pay off these obliga-
tions if it is financially and legally able to do so, thus saving the
interest cost.
In 1908 the City of Buffalo issued water bonds aggregating
$500,000 for a 50 year term at 4% interest. These bonds were
by their terms callable by the city "at the expiration of 20 years
from the date of issue." The obligations were clearly callable in
1928. The question whether they were callable only then or at any
time thereafter was before the Court in City of Buffalo v. Strong
& Co. The city sought a declaratory judgment that it had a right
to call the bonds; the bondholders contended that the terms of the
bonds gave the city an option to call them which had to be exer-
cised upon a "pin-pointed" day, or at the most within a reason-
able time after that day. The majority of the Court, finding this
argument of the bondholders to be unreasonable, examined the
L
25. For another case involving condemnation, see Delaware County Electric Co-
operative v. City of New York, 304 N. Y. 196, 106 N. E. 2d 605 (1952), which turns
upon the construction of a lease in which the utility had agreed to limitations on the
City's liability under the ADmsTnA=n CODE, Title E, Chap. 15.
26. McQumL=, op. cit., 39.07.
27. Art VIIL
28. IT. Rzv. CoDz §22(b)4.
29. So important a factor is this tax advantage that LOCAL FINANCE LAW §§ 58:00,
59:00 now provide that a municipality requesting bids may give the bidder the right
to refuse to accept delivery if the income tax regulations change.
30. 304 N. Y. 132, 106 N. E. 2d 217 (1952).
